Are words essentially meaningless

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Philosophical Investigations

In general, progress has the fact that it looks much bigger than it really is.


In the following I publish thoughts, the precipitate of philosophical investigations that have occupied me over the past 16 years. They concern many subjects: the concept of meaning, understanding, sentence, logic, the fundamentals of mathematics, states of consciousness and other things. I wrote down all of these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs. Sometimes in long chains, over the same subject, sometimes jumping quickly from one area to another. - It was my intention from the beginning to summarize all of this in a book, of the form of which I had different ideas at different times. But it seemed to me essential that thoughts should progress from one object to another in a natural and uninterrupted sequence.
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I would never succeed. That the best I could write would always be philosophical remarks; that my thoughts would soon paralyze if I tried to force them on in one direction, against their natural inclination. - And this was of course connected with the nature of the investigation itself. For it forces us to travel through a wide field of thought, criss-cross, in all directions. - The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a multitude of landscape sketches that arose on these long and intricate journeys.
The same points, or almost the same, were always touched anew from different directions and new images were always created. A great number of these were listed, or uncharacteristic, afflicted with all the defects of a weak draftsman. And when these were eliminated, there were a number of halfway left over, which now had to be arranged, often cropped, so that they could give the viewer a picture of the landscape. - So this book is really just an album.
Until recently, I had actually given up the idea of ​​publishing my work during my lifetime. He was, however, from time to time. Time was stimulated, mainly because I had to find out that the results I had passed on in lectures, scripts and discussions were often misunderstood, more or less watered down or mutilated. This piqued my vanity and struggled to calm her down.
But two years ago I had reason to reread my first book (the Logical-Philosophical Treatise) and to explain his thoughts. Then it suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that these could only get their proper illumination through the contrast and against the background of my older way of thinking.
Since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again 16 years ago, I had to recognize grave errors in what I had written down in that first book. The criticism which my ideas received from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life, has helped me to understand these errors. - Even more than this - always powerful and secure - I owe criticism to those whom a teacher at this university, Mr. P. Sraffa, has continuously exercised on my thoughts for many years. It is to this motivation that I owe the most momentous of the ideas in this book.
For more than one reason, what I publish here will interfere with what others are writing today. - If my remarks do not have a stamp on them that identifies them as mine, - I do not want to claim them as my property either.
I hand them over to the public with dubious feelings. That it should be granted to this work in its poverty and the darkness of this time. Throwing light into one brain or the other is not impossible; but of course not likely.
I don't want to spare others the thought with my writing. But if it were possible, stimulate someone to think of their own.
I would have liked to have produced a good book. It didn't turn out that way; But the time is over when I could improve it.

Cambridge, January 1945


1. Augustine, in Confessiones I / 8: cum ipsi (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejicindis, fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque iam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam.

[If the adults named an object and turned to it, I perceived it and I understood that the object was signified by the sounds they uttered, that they wanted to refer to it. But I took this from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language that shows the feelings of the soul through facial play and eye play, through the movements of the limbs and the sound of the voice, when it desires something, or holds on to something, or rejects or flees. In this way I gradually learned to understand what things denoted the words that I heard over and over again, in their specific places in different sentences. And when my mouth had got used to these signs, I expressed my wishes through them.]

In these words, it seems to me, we get a definite picture of the essence of human language. Namely this: The words of language designate objects - sentences are combinations of such designations. - In this picture of language we find the roots of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is assigned to the word. It is the object for which the word stands.
Augustine does not speak of a difference in parts of speech. Anyone who describes learning the language in this way thinks, I would like to believe, first of all of nouns such as "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of people, only secondarily of the names of certain activities and qualities. and to the other parts of speech as something that will be found.
Now think of this use of language: I'm sending someone out to do some shopping. I give him a piece of paper with the following signs: "five red apples". He takes the note to the merchant; he opens the drawer on which the symbol "apple" is written; then he looks for the word "red" in a table and finds a color sample across from it; now he says the series of basic numerals - I assume he knows them by heart - up to the word "five" and with each numerical word he takes an apple from the drawer that is the same color as the pattern. - So, and similar, one operates with words. - "But how does he know where and how to look up the word" red "and what to do with the word" five "?" - Well, I assume he is acting as I have described it. The explanations come to an end somewhere. -But what is the meaning of the word "five"? - There was no mention of such at all here; only about how the word "five" is used.

2. That philosophical concept of meaning is at home with a primitive idea of ​​the way language works. But one can also say that it is the idea of ​​a more primitive language than ours.
Let us think of a language for which the description, as Augustine gave it, is correct: The language should serve the communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A builds a building made of building blocks; there are cubes, columns, plates and beams. B has to hand him the building blocks, one after the other, as A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "plate", "beam". A calls them out; -B brings the stone he has learned to bring to this call. -Take this as complete primitive language.

3. Augustine describes, we could say, a system of understanding; only not everything we call language is this system. And that has to be said in so many cases where the question arises: "Is this representation useful or useless?" The answer is then: "Yes, useful; but only for this narrowly defined area, not for the whole that you claim to represent. "
It is as if someone was declaring: "Playing consists in moving things around on a surface according to certain rules ..." - and we answer him: You seem to be thinking of board games; but these are not all games. You can correct your explanation by expressly restricting it to these games.

4. Think of a script in which letters would be used to denote sounds, but also to denote stress and punctuation marks. (A script can be understood as a language for describing phonetic images.) Now imagine that someone understood this script as if every letter simply corresponded to a sound and as if the letters did not also have completely different functions. Such an overly simple conception of Scripture resembles Augustine's conception of language.

5. If one looks at the example in § 1, one may suspect to what extent the general concept of the meaning of words surrounds the functioning of language with a haze that makes clear vision impossible. It dispels the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive ways of using them, in which one can clearly overlook the purpose and functioning of the words.
Such primitive forms of language are used by the child when learning to speak. The teaching of the language here is not an explanation, but a training.

6. We could imagine that the language in § 2 is the whole Language of A and B is; yes, the whole language of a tribe. The children are raised to these To perform activities, these To use words, and so to respond to the words of the other.
An important part of the training will be for the teacher to point to the objects, draw the child's attention to them, and speak a word at the same time; z. B. the word "plate" when showing this shape. (I don't want to call this "indicative explanation" or "definition" because the child hasn't yet been named ask can. I will call it "indicative teaching of the words." - I say it will be an important part of training because it is the case with humans; not because it could not be imagined otherwise.) This indicative teaching of the words, one might say, suggests an associative connection between the word and the thing:
But what does that mean? Well, it can mean different things; but one thinks first of all that the image of the thing comes to the child when he hears the word. But if that happens now - is that the purpose of the word? - yes it can be the purpose. - I can imagine such a use of words (series of sounds). (Speaking a word is like striking a key on the introductory piano.) But it is in the language in § 2 Not the purpose of the words to create ideas. (Of course, it can also be found that this is conducive to the actual purpose.)
But if that does the indicative teaching - shall I say it does the understanding of the word? Doesn't he understand the call "record!" Who acts according to him in one way or another? - But this probably helped bring about the indicative teaching; but only together with a specific lesson. With a different lesson, the same indicative teaching of these words would have resulted in an entirely different understanding.
"By connecting the rod to the lever, I repair the brake." - Yes, given the rest of the mechanism. Only with this he is the brake lever; and detached from its support it is not even a lever, but can be anything or nothing.

7. In the practice of using language (2) one part calls the words, the other acts on them; in the teaching of the language, however, it becomes this Find process: the learner names things. That means he speaks the word when the teacher points to the stone. - Yes, the even simpler exercise will be found here: the pupil repeats the words that the teacher says to him - both speech-like processes. We can also imagine that the whole process of using the words in (2) is one of those games through which children learn their mother tongue. I want these games »Language games«And sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language game.
And the processes of naming the stones and repeating the spoken word could also be called language games. Think of some of the uses made of words in round games.
I will also call the whole: the language and the activities with which it is interwoven, the "language game".

8. Let us consider an extension of language (2). In addition to the four words "cube", "column", etc., it contains a series of words that are used as the merchant in (1) uses numerals (it can be the series of letters of the alphabet); Furthermore, two words, they may be "there" and "this" (because this already roughly indicates their purpose), they are used in connection with a pointing hand movement; and finally a number of color swatches. A gives a command of the type "d-plate-there". He lets the assistant see a color sample, and when he says "there" he points to a place on the building site. B takes from the supply of plates one of the color of the pattern for each letter of the alphabet up to the "d" and brings them to the place A designates. - On other occasions, A gives the order:
"This-there". With "this" he points to a building block. Etc.

9. When the child learns this language, it has to memorize the series of 'numerals' a, b, c, ... by heart. And it has to learn how to use it. - Will there be an indicative teaching of the words in this lesson? - Well, for example, plates will be pointed and counted: "a, b, c plates". - More similarity with the instructional teaching of the words "cube", "column", etc. would have the instructional teaching of numerals, which are not used for counting, but to designate groups of things that can be grasped with the eye. That's how children learn that use the first five or six basic numerals.
Is "there" and "this" also taught as indicative? - Imagine how they could be taught to use them! It will be pointed to places and things - but here this pointing also happens in the use of words and not just in learning how to use them. -

10. What describe now the words of this language? - What they designate, how should I show it, except in the way they are used? And we have described it. The expression "this word signifies the «Should therefore become part of this description. Or: the description should be brought to the form: "The word ... denotes ...".
Well, the description of the use of the word "plate" can be shortened to say that this word designates this object. That will be done if, for example, it is only a matter of eliminating the misunderstanding that the word "plate" refers to the building block shape that we actually call "cube" - the way this ›Reference‹But, i.e. the use of these words for the rest, is known.
And in the same way one can say that the characters "a", "b", etc. denote numbers; if this clears up the misunderstanding that "a", "b", "c" play the role in language that "cube", "plate", "pillar" actually play.And one can also say that "c" denotes this number and not that; when it is used to explain, for example, that the letters are to be used in the order a, b, c, d, etc. and not in the following order: a, b, d, c.
But by making the descriptions of the use of the words similar to one another, this use cannot become more similar! Because, as we can see, it is completely dissimilar.

11. Think of the tools in a tool box: there's a hammer, pliers, saw, screwdriver, rule, glue pot, glue, nails, and screws. The functions of words are as different as the functions of these objects. (And there are similarities here and there.)
Of course, what confuses us is the uniformity of their appearance when the words are spoken to us, or encountered in writing and in print. Because theirs use is not so clearly in front of us. Especially not when we philosophize!

12. Like when we look into the driver's cab of a locomotive: there are handles that all look more or less the same. (This is understandable, because they should all be touched by hand.) But one is the handle of a crank that can be continuously adjusted (it regulates the opening of a valve); Another is the handle of a switch, which has only two effective positions, it is either thrown or set up; a third is the handle of a brake lever, the harder you pull, the harder you brake; a fourth, the handle of a pump, it only works as long as it is moved back and forth.

13. When we say: "Every word in language denotes something", this is still the case for the time being at all nothing said; unless we clearly stated Which Distinction we wish to make. (It could be that we wanted to distinguish the words of language (8) from words "without meaning" as they appear in Lewis Carroll's poems, or from words like "juwiwallera" in a song.)

14. Imagine someone said: "All Tools are used to modify something. So, the hammer the position of the nail, the saw the shape of the board, etc. «- And what does the scale, the glue pot, the nails modify? - "Our knowledge of the length of a thing, the temperature of the glue, and the strength of the box." - Would this assimilation of the expression gain anything? -

15. The word "to designate" is perhaps most directly applied where the sign appears on the object which it designates. Assume that the tools A uses to build have certain symbols on them. If A shows such a sign to the assistant, he brings the tool that is provided with the sign.
Thus, and in more or less similar ways, a name signifies a thing, and a name is given to a thing. - It will often prove useful when we say to ourselves when philosophizing: To name something, that is something like pinning a name plaque to a thing.

16. What about the color samples that A shows to B - they belong to language? Well, whatever you want. They do not belong to the verbal language; but if I say to someone: »pronounce the word› that ‹«, you will also count this second »› that ‹« in a sentence. And yet it plays a very similar role as a color pattern in the language game (8); for it is a model of what the other should say.
It is the most natural, and the least confusing, when we count the patterns among the tools of language. ((Note on the reflexive pronoun »this Sentence".))

17. We will be able to say: in language (8) we have different ones Parts of speech. Because the function of the word "plate" and the word "cube" are more similar to each other than that of "plate" and "d". But how we group the words together by species will depend on the purpose of the division - and on our inclination.
Think of the different ways in which tools can be divided into tool types. Or chess pieces in piece types.

18. Don't let it bother you that languages ​​(2) and (8) consist only of commands. If you want to say that this is why they are not complete, ask yourself whether our language is complete; - whether it was before chemical symbolism and infinitesimal notation were incorporated into it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And with how many houses, or streets, does a city begin to be a city?) Our language can be seen as an old city: A nook and cranny of alleys and squares, old and new houses, and houses with additions from different times; and this is surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and with monotonous houses.

19. One can easily imagine a language that consists only of commands and messages in battle. - Or a language that consists only of questions and an expression of affirmation and negation. And countless others. - And to imagine a language means to imagine a way of life.
But what is it like: Is the call "record!" In example (2) a sentence or a word? - If a word does, it does not have the same meaning as the one with the same name in our ordinary language, because in § 2 it is a call. But if a sentence is, it is not the elliptical sentence "plate!" Of our language. - As for the first question, you can call "record!" A word and also a sentence; perhaps aptly a 'degenerate sentence' (as one speaks of a degenerate hyperbola), namely our 'elliptical' sentence. - But that's just a shortened form of the sentence "Bring me a record!" And this sentence does not exist in example (2). - But why shouldn't I, the other way around, use the sentence "Bring me a record!" renewal of the phrase "record!" - Because the one who shouts “Record!” Actually means: “Bring me a record!”. - But how do you do that mean thiswhile you "plate" say? Do you speak the unabridged sentence to yourself inside? And why should I, in order to say what one person means by the call "plate", translate this expression into another? And if they mean the same thing - why shouldn't I say: »when he says 'record', he means 'record!'«? Or: why shouldn't you mean "record" when you can mean "bring me the record"? - But when I shout "Record!" I want to he should bring me a record! - Certainly, but does 'wanting this' consist in your thinking, in some form or other, of a sentence other than the one you are saying? -

20. But if someone says "Bring me a record!", It now seems as if he could use this expression as a long word mean: corresponding to the one word "plate!" - So can you use it as a a Word, once as four Mean words? And how do you usually mean it? - I think we will be inclined to say: We mean the sentence as one of four words when we use it in contrast to other sentences, such as "rich give me a record ”,“ bring it him a record «,» Bring two Plates, etc .; thus in contrast to sentences which contain the words of our command in other combinations. - But what does it consist in using a sentence in contrast to other sentences? Are you thinking of these sentences? And all? And while you say the one sentence, or before or after? - no! While such an explanation has some temptation for us, we need only consider for a moment what is really going on to see that we are on the wrong track here. We say we use the command in contrast to other sentences because our language contains the possibility of these other propositions. Anyone who does not understand our language, a foreigner who would often have heard someone giving the order "Bring me a record!", Could be of the opinion that this whole series of sounds is one word and corresponds roughly to the word for "building block" in their language . If he had given this order even then, he would perhaps pronounce it differently, and we would say: He pronounces it so strangely because he pronounces it for a Keep your word. - But if he pronounces it does not happen something else in him, - the accordingly that he uses the sentence as a Word? - The same thing can happen in him, or something else. What is going on in you when you give such an order; are you aware that it consists of four words, while you pronounce it Yes, you do master this language - in which there are also those other sentences - but this mastery is something that ›happens‹While you are pronouncing the sentence? - And I have admitted: the stranger will probably pronounce the sentence differently if he understands it differently; but what we call the wrong view got to not lying in anything that accompanies the issuing of the command.
The sentence is' elliptical 'not because it leaves out something we mean when we pronounce it, but because it is shortened - in comparison with a certain example of our grammar - one could of course make the objection here:' You admit that the shortened and the unabbreviated sentence have the same meaning. - So what's the point? Isn't there a word expression for this sense? ”- But does the same meaning of the sentences not consist in their same use - (In Russian it means “stone red” instead of “the stone is red”; they miss the copula in their minds, right? think do you have the copula?)

21. Imagine a language game in which B, when asked by A, reports the number of tiles or cubes in a pile, or the colors and shapes of the building blocks that are there and there. - Such a message could therefore read: "Five records". Now what is the difference between the message, or claim, "Five disks" and the command "Five disks!"? - Well, the role that pronouncing these words plays in the language game. But the tone in which they are pronounced will also be different, and the expression, and many other things. But we can also imagine that the tone is the same - because a command and a message can be in various things Tones are pronounced and with different expressions - and that the difference lies only in the use. (Of course, we could also use the words "assertion" and "command" to designate a grammatical sentence form and an intonation; as we call a question, "Isn't the weather wonderful today?", Although it is used as an assertion.) We could think of a language in which all Claims have the form and tone of rhetorical questions; or every command takes the form of the question: "Would you like to do that?" One might then say: "What he says has the form of a question, but is really an order" - that is, has the function of the command in practice Language. (Similarly, one says "You will do this", not as a prophecy, but as an order. What makes it one thing and what another?)

22. Frege's view that there is an assumption in an assertion, which is what is asserted, is actually based on the possibility that there is in our language of writing every assertion sentence in the form “It is asserted that this and that is the case is. "- But" That this and that is the case "is just not a sentence in our language - it is not yet a sentence train in the language game. And if I write instead of "It is asserted that ..." "It is asserted: this and that is the case", then the words "It is asserted" are superfluous here.
We could very well also write each assertion in the form of a question with an affirmative affirmation; like: 'Is it raining? Yes! ”Would that show that there is a question in every assertion?
One has the right to use an assertion mark as opposed to a question mark, for example; or if you want to distinguish an assertion from a fiction, or an assumption. It is only wrong to think that the assertion now consists of two acts, the consideration and the assertion (attaching the truth value, or the like) and that we perform these acts according to the sign of the sentence, roughly as we sing according to notes . Singing from sheet music can be compared to reading the written sentence aloud or softly, but not the ›Mean‹(Thinking) of the sentence read.
The Fregesche assertion mark emphasizes that Start of sentence. So it has a similar function to the end point. It distinguishes the whole period from the sentence in the period. If I hear someone say "it's raining" but don't know whether I have heard the beginning and the end of the period, this sentence is not a means of communication for me.

Let us imagine a picture of a boxer in a certain fighting position. This image can now be used to tell someone how to stand, how to hold himself up; or how he should not hold himself; or how a certain man has stood there and there; or etc. etc. One could call this picture (chemically speaking) a sentence radical. Frege probably thought of "assumption" in a similar way.

23. But how many types of sentences are there? Assertions, questions and orders? - There are countless Such ways: countless different ways of using everything that we call "signs", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not a fixed thing, something that is given once and for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we can say, arise and others become obsolete and are forgotten. (A approximate The changes in mathematics can give us a picture of this.)
The word “spokegame«Should emphasize here that speaking the language is part of an activity or a way of life. Imagine the diversity of language games with these examples and others:
  • Orders, and act according to orders -
  • Describing an object after looking at it, or after taking measurements -
  • Manufacture of an object according to a description (drawing) -
  • Reporting of an incident -
  • Make assumptions about what happened -
  • Make a hypothesis and test it -
  • Presentation of the results of an experiment using tables and diagrams -
  • Make up a story; and reading -
  • Play theater -
  • Sing round dance -
  • Guessing puzzles -
  • To joke; tell -
  • Solve an applied calculation example -
  • Translate from one language to the other -
  • Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
It is interesting to compare the variety of tools of language and their modes of use, the variety of types of words and sentences, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (And also the author of the Logical-Philosophical Treatise.) .

24. Anyone who does not see the variety of language games will be inclined to questions like this: "What is a question?" - Is it the statement that I don't know this and that, or the statement that I wish , the other would like to tell me ...? Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty? - And is the cry "Help!" Such a description?
Remember how many different things are called "description": description of the position of a body by its coordinates; Description of a facial expression; Description of a tactile sensation; a mood.
Of course, instead of the usual form of the question, one can use the statement or description: "I want to know whether ..." or "I am in doubt whether ..." - but with that one has the various language games not brought closer to each other.
The significance of such possibilities of transformation, e.g. all assertion sentences into sentences that begin with the clause "I think" or "I believe" (i.e. in descriptions, so to speak mine Inner life) will appear more clearly elsewhere. (Solipsism.)

25. It is sometimes said: the animals do not speak because they lack mental abilities. And that means: "They don't think, that's why they don't speak". But: they just don't speak. Or better: they don't use the language - if we disregard the most primitive forms of language. - Commanding, asking, talking, chatting are part of our natural history just like walking, eating, drinking and playing.

26. One thinks that learning the language consists in naming objects. Namely: people, shapes, colors, pain, moods, numbers etc. As I said - naming is something like pinning a name on a thing. This can be called a preparation for using a word. But on what is it a preparation?

27. “We name things and can now talk about them. Referring to them in our speech. ”- As if the act of naming had already given us what we were going to do. As if there was only one thing that means: "Talking about things". While we do the most diverse things with our sentences. Let us only think of the exclamations. With their very different functions.
Are you still inclined to call these words "names of objects"?
In the languages ​​(2) and (8) there was no question about the naming. This and its correlate, the indicative explanation, is, as we could say, a language game of its own. That actually means: we are educated, trained to ask: "What is that called?" - whereupon the naming takes place. And there is also a language game: inventing a name for something. So to say: "That means ... .. «, and now to use the new name. (This is how children name their dolls, for example, and then talk about them and to them. At the same time, consider how strange the use of the personal name with which we call the named one is call!)

28. You can now define a person's name, a color word, a substance name, a number word, the name of a point of the compass, etc. in an indicative way. The definition of the number two "That means 'two'" - pointing to two nuts - is perfectly exact. - But how can you define the two like that? The one who is given the definition doesn't know What one wants to name with "two"; he will assume that you these Call the group of nuts "two"! - He can accept this; but maybe he won't accept it. Conversely, if I wanted to attach a name to this group of nuts, he could also misunderstand it as a numerical name. And just as well, if I explain a person's name as an indicative, interpret it as a color name, as a designation of the race, even as the name of a point of the compass. That is, the indicative definition can be in each Case to be interpreted in one way or another. .

29. Perhaps one says: the two can only be defined in an indicative way: »This number means 'two' ”. Because the word "number" indicates which one place the language, the grammar, we put the word. But that means that the word "number" must be explained before that indicative definition can be understood. - The word "number" in the definition, however, indicates this place; the post to which we put the floor. And so we can prevent misunderstandings by saying: “This colour is called so and so «,» this one length means so and so ”, etc. That means: misunderstandings are sometimes avoided in this way. But can the word "color" or "length" only be understood in this way? - Well, we just have to explain it. - So explain with other words! And what about the last statement in this chain? (Don't say, “There is no 'final' explanation.” It's like saying, “There's no last house on this street; you can always add one.”)
Whether the word "number" is necessary in the indicative definition of two depends on whether he understands it differently than I would like without this word. And that will probably depend on the circumstances under which it is given and on the person to whom I give it.
And how he "understands" the explanation is shown in how he makes use of the declared word.

Could one point to something to explain the word "red"? not red is? That would be similar to explaining the word “modest” to someone who does not speak German, and pointing to an arrogant person to explain it and saying “This one is Not modest". It is not an argument against such an explanation that it is ambiguous. Any explanation can be misunderstood.
But one could ask: Should we still call this an "explanation"? For it naturally plays a different role in the calculus than what we usually call the "indicative explanation" of the word "red"; even if they have the same practical consequences, the same effect on the learner.

30. So one could say: the indicative definition explains the use - the meaning - of the word, if it is already clear what role the word is supposed to play in language. So if I know that someone wants to explain a word in color to me, the explanatory explanation "That means 'Sepia'" will help me understand the word. - And one can say this if one does not forget that all sorts of questions are linked to the word "know" or "be clear". You have to know (or be able to) something in order to be able to ask about the naming. But what do you have to know?

31. If you show someone the king piece in a chess game and say "This is the chess king", you don't explain the use of this piece to him - unless he already knows the rules of the game, except for this last definition: the form a king figure. One can imagine that he learned the rules of the game without ever being shown a real character. The shape of the game figure corresponds to the sound or the shape of a word.
But you can also imagine. Someone learned the game without ever learning or formulating rules. For example, he first learned very simple board games by watching and has progressed to increasingly complex ones. He could also be given the explanation: "This is the king" - if, for example, you show him chess pieces of an unfamiliar shape. This explanation, too, teaches him the use of the figure only because, as we could say, the place in which it was placed was already prepared. Or also: We will only say that it teaches him how to use it when the place has already been prepared. And it is here not because the one to whom we are giving the explanation already knows the rules, but because in a different sense he has already mastered a game.
Consider this case: I explain the game of chess to someone; and start by pointing to a figure and saying, “This is the king. He can pull so and so, etc. etc. «. - In this case we will say: the words "This is the king" (or "That means" king "") are only a word explanation if the learner already "knows what a pawn is". So if he has already played other games or has watched others play 'with understanding' - and the same. Only then will he be able to ask relevant questions while learning the game: "What's that called?" - namely, this character. We can say: Only those who know what to do with it will ask for the name.
We can also imagine that the person asked answers: "Determine the name yourself" - and now the person who asked would have to pay for everything himself.

32. Those who come to a foreign country will sometimes learn the language of the locals through explanatory explanations that they give them; and he will interpret these explanations often guess have to guess and sometimes right, sometimes wrong.
And now, I believe, we can say: Augustine described the learning of human language as if the child had come to a foreign country and did not understand the language of the country; that means: as if it already had a language, just not this one. Or also: as if the child could already thinkjust don't speak yet. And "thinking" would mean something like: speaking to yourself.

33. How, however, if one objected: “It is not true that someone has to master a language game in order to understand an indicative definition, but must - of course - know (or guess) what the person explaining is pointing to! So whether it is, for example, on the shape of the object, or on its color, or on the number, etc. etc. «- And what does it consist of -› pointing to the shape ‹,› pointing to the color ‹? Point to a piece of paper! - And now point to its shape, - now to its color, - now to its number (that sounds strange!) - Well, how did you do it? - You will say that you have something different every time you show ›meant‹. And when I ask how this is done, you will say you have focused your attention on the color, shape, etc. But now I wear again how the going on.
Think someone points to a vase and says, “Look at the wonderful blue! - the shape is not important. - "Or:" Look at the wonderful shape! - the color is indifferent. «It is undoubtedly you will various do when you do both of these prompts. But do you always do that Samewhen you turn your attention to the color? Just imagine different cases! I want to suggest some:
“Is this blue the same as that over there? Do you see a difference? "
You mix the colors and say: "This blue of the sky is hard to hit."
"It's going to be nice, you can see the blue sky again!"
"Look how different these two blue appear!"
“Do you see the blue book there? Bring it here. "
"This blue light signal means ..."
“What is the name of this blue? - is it ›indigo‹? ”
To pay attention to the color is sometimes done by holding away the outline of the shape with your hand; or not looking at the outline of the thing; or staring at the object and trying to remember where you have already seen this color.
One directs one's attention to the shape, sometimes by tracing it, sometimes by blinking so as not to see the color clearly, etc. etc. I want to say: this and the like happens, while one 'draws attention to this and that'. But that is not the only thing that makes us say that someone directs his attention to the shape, the color, etc. Just as a chess move does not consist solely in moving a stone one way or the other on the board - but also not in the thoughts and feelings of the passenger accompanying the train; but in the circumstances that we call: "playing a game of chess", "solving a chess problem", and the like.

34. But suppose someone said: "I always do the same thing when I direct my attention to the shape: I follow the contour with my eyes and feel ...". And assume that the other person gives the explanatory explanation "That means 'circle'" "by pointing to a circular object with all these experiences - the other person cannot nevertheless interpret the explanation differently, even if he sees that he Explanatory follows the form with his eyes, and even if he feels what the explanatory feels? That means: this 'interpretation' can also consist of how he now makes use of the explained word, e.g. what he points to when he receives the command 'Point to a circle!'. - Because neither the expression "mean the explanation so and so" nor the expression "interpret the explanation so and so" designate a process that accompanies the giving and hearing of the explanation.

35. There are, of course, what can be called "characteristic experiences" for pointing to the form, for example. For example, following the contour with your finger or with your gaze while pointing. - But as little as this in all cases in which I "mean the form," just as little does any other characteristic process happen in any of these cases. - But even if such a thing was repeated in all, it would depend on the circumstances - that is, what happens before and after the showing - whether we would say "He pointed to the form and not to the color «.
Because the words "point to the form", "mean the form" etc. are not used as the: "To point to this book" (not to that), "to point to the chair, not to the table", etc. - Just think how different we are to the use of words learn: "To point to this thing", "to point to that thing", and on the other hand: "to point to the color, not to the form", "the colour mean «, etc. etc.
As I said, in certain cases, especially when pointing ›to the form‹ or ›to the number,‹ there are characteristic experiences and types of pointing - ›characteristic‹ because they are often (not always) repeated wherever shape or number To be 'meant'. But do you also know a characteristic experience for pointing at the game figure, as game piece? And yet one can say, “I mean, this one game piece is called 'King', not that particular piece of wood that I am pointing to '. (Recognize, wish, remember, etc.)

36. And here we are doing what we do in a thousand similar cases: Because we are not a can indicate physical action, which we call pointing to the form (in contrast to e.g. the color), we say that these words correspond to a mental activity.
Where our language leads us to suspect a body and there is no body, there, we would like to say, be one ghost.

37. What is the relationship between the name and the named? - Well what is you? Look at the language game (2), or another one! there you can see what this relationship consists of. This relationship can, among many other things, also consist in the fact that hearing the name calls to our soul the image of what is named, and it also consists, among other things, in the fact that the name is written on the named, or that it appears when it is pointed the named is pronounced.

38. But what is the name of the word "this" in the language game (8), or the word "that" in the explanatory explanation "That means ..."? - If you don't want to cause confusion, it is best to say not at all that these words name something. - And strangely enough, the word "this" was once said to be that actual Surname. Everything that we otherwise call "name" is only in an imprecise, approximate sense.
This strange conception stems from a tendency to sublimate - what you might call it - the logic of our language. The real answer to this is: "Name" is what we call it very different; the word "name" characterizes many different ways of using a word related to one another in many different ways; - but among these kinds of usage is not that of the word "this".
It is probably true that we often, e.g. in the indicative definition, point to what is named and pronounce the name at the same time. And in the same way, e.g. in the indicative definition, we pronounce the word "this" by pointing to a thing. And the word "this" and a name are often in the same place in the context of a sentence. But it is characteristic of the name that it is explained by the indicative "This is N" (or "That means 'N'"). But do we also explain: "That means 'this'" or "This means" this ""?
This has to do with the conception of naming as an occult process, so to speak. The naming appears as one strange Connection of a word to an object. - And one of those strange Connection really takes place, namely when the philosopher, in order to find out what the relationship between name and named is, stares at an object in front of him and repeats a name countless times, or even the word "this". Because the philosophical problems arise when the language celebrates. And there we can, however, imagine that naming is some strange mental act, a kind of baptism of an object. And so we can also use the word "this" as it were to tell the subject him with it speak to - a strange use of this word that appears only in philosophizing.

How does it go: the words »The is blue "once as a statement about the object to which one points - once as an explanation of the word" blue " mean? In the second case, one actually means »That means 'blue'« - Can we mean the word as »is« and the word »blue« as »is« »» blue ««? and another time the "is" really than "is"?
It can also happen that someone draws a verbal explanation from what was meant by the communication. [Side note: A momentous superstition lies hidden here.]
Can I use the word "bububu" to mean "If it doesn't rain, I'll go for a walk"? - I can only mean something with something in one language. This clearly shows that the grammar of "mine" is not similar to that of the expression "imagine something" and the like.

39. But why does one get the idea of ​​wanting to make this word into a name when it is obviously? no Name is? - That's why. For one is tempted to object to what is usually called "name"; and you can express it like this: that the name should actually denote simple things. And one could justify this as follows: A proper name in the ordinary sense is the word "Nothung". The sword Nothung consists of parts in a certain composition. If they are composed differently, then necessity does not exist. But now the sentence "Nothung has a sharp edge" sensewhether Nothung is still whole or already broken. But if "Nothung" is the name of an object, then this object no longer exists when Nothung has been destroyed; and since there would then be no object corresponding to the name, it would have no meaning. But then in the sentence "Nothung has a sharp edge" there would be a word that has no meaning, and therefore the sentence would be nonsense. But now it makes sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists. So the word "Nothung" must disappear in the analysis of the meaning, and words must appear in its place that name simple things. We shall reasonably call these words the actual names.

40. Let's get over first the Talking point of this train of thought: that the word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. - It is important to note that the word "meaning" is used in a non-verbal manner when it is used to denote the thing that corresponds to the word "corresponds". This is to confuse the meaning of a name with that carrier of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies, it is said that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning of the name dies. And it would be nonsense to talk like that, because if the name ceased to have any meaning, there would be no point in saying "Mr. N. N. has died".

41. In § 15 we introduced proper names into language (8). Now assume that the tool named "N" broke. A doesn't know and gives B the sign "N". Does this sign mean something or doesn't it? - What should B do when he receives this sign? - We didn't agree on anything. One could ask: what becomes he do? Well, he might stand there perplexed, or show A the pieces. One could say here: "N" has become meaningless; and this expression would mean that the character "N" is no longer used in our language game (unless we give it a new one). "N" could also become meaningless if, for whatever reason, the tool was given a different name and the character "N" was no longer used in the language game. - But we can also think of an agreement according to which B, when a tool is broken and A gives the sign of this tool, has to shake his head in response. - One could say that the command "N" has been included in the language game, even if this tool no longer exists, and the character "N" has meaning even if its carrier ceases to exist.

42. But names also have meaning in that game, the never have been used for a tool? - let's assume that "X" is such a sign, and A would give this sign to B - well, such signs could also be included in the language game, and B would have to answer them with a shake of the head. (You could think of this as some kind of amusement for the two of them.)

43. One can go for one size Class of cases of use of the word "meaning" - if not for all Cases of its use - explain this word as follows: The meaning of a word is its use in language.
And the importance A name is sometimes explained by looking at its carrier shows.

44. We said: the sentence "Nothung has a sharp edge" makes sense, even if Nothung has already been broken. Well, that's because in this language game a name is used even in the absence of its bearer. But we can imagine a language game with names (that is, with signs which we will certainly also call "names") in which these are only used in the presence of the bearer; so always can be replaced by the indicative pronoun with the indicative sign.

45. The indicative "this" can never become unsupported. You could say, “As long as there is a This gives, as long as the word ›this‹ also has a meaning, ob this is now simple or compound. ”- But that doesn't make the word a name. On the contrary; for a name is not used with the pointing gesture, but only explained by it.

46. What is the reason for the fact that names actually denote the simple? -
Socrates (in Theätetus): “If I am not mistaken, I have heard from a number of them: for them Primordial elements - to put it this way - of which we and everything else are composed, there is no explanation; because everything that is in and of itself can only be understood by name describe; another determination is not possible, neither that, it be, nor the, it is not .... But what is in and of itself must be named .... without any other provisions. But it is therefore impossible to speak of any primordial element in an explanatory manner; for there is nothing for this but the mere naming; it only has its name. But just as that which is composed of these primordial elements is itself an interwoven structure, so too its names in this interweaving have become explanatory speech; because their essence is the interweaving of names. «These primordial elements were also Russell's› individuals ‹, and also my› objects ‹(Log. Phil. Dep. ).

47. But what are the simple parts that make up reality? - What are the simple components of an armchair? - The pieces of wood it's made of? Or the molecules, or the atoms? - "Simple" means: not put together. And then it depends: in what sense is it 'composed'? There is no point in talking about the 'simple parts of the armchair'.
Or: Is my facial image of this tree, this armchair, made up of parts? and what are its simple components? Is multicolored a Type of composite; another is, for example, that of a broken contour made up of straight pieces. And a curve segment can be said to be composed of an ascending and a descending branch.
If I say to someone without further explanation, "What I see now is composed", he will rightly ask: "What do you mean by 'composed'? That can mean anything! ”- The question“ Is what you see compounded? ”Makes sense if it is already clear what kind of compounding - that is, what particular use of this word - it is supposed to be. If it had been determined that the facial image of a tree should be called "composite" when one sees not only a trunk but also branches, the question would have been "Is the facial image of this tree simple or composite?" And the question "What are its simple components ? «A clear sense - a clear use. And of course the answer to the second question is not "Die Aste" (this would be an answer to the grammatical Question: “What is called do you use the ›simple components‹? ”) but a description of the individual branches.
But isn't a chessboard, for example, obviously and simply put together? - You are probably thinking of the combination of 32 white and 32 black squares. But couldn't we say, for example, that it is composed of the colors white, black and the scheme of the square network? And if there are very different ways of looking at things, do you mean to say that the chessboard is simply 'put together'? - Outside In a certain game, asking, "Is this object put together?" is similar to what a boy once did when he was asked to indicate whether the verbs in certain sentence examples were used in the active or in the passive form, and who now is It puzzled me whether, for example, the verb "sleep" meant something active or something passive.
The word "compound" (and therefore the word "simple") is used by us in a myriad of different ways related to one another in different ways. (Is the color of a chess field simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure yellow? And is the white simple, or does it consist of the colors of the rainbow? - Is this 2 cm stretch simple, or does it consist of two sections of each 1 cm? But why not from a piece of 3 cm length and a, in a negative sense, piece of 1 cm?)
On the philosophical Question: "Is the facial image of this tree composed, and what are its components?" Is the correct answer: "That depends on what you mean by 'composed'." (And of course that is not an answer, but a rejection of the question .)

48. Let us apply the method of § 2 to the presentation in the Theätetus apply. Let us consider a language game for which this representation really applies. The language is used to represent combinations of colored squares on a surface. The squares form a chessboard-shaped complex. There are red, green, white, and black squares. Let the words of language be (correspondingly): "R", "G", "W", "S", and a sentence is a series of these words. They describe a compilation of squares in sequence

The sentence »RRSGGGRWW« describes, for example, a composition of this type:

Here the sentence is a complex of names to which a complex of elements corresponds. The primordial elements are the colored squares. "But are these simple?" - I don't see what more naturally I should call the "simple" in this language game. Under other circumstances, however, I would call a single-colored square "composed", for example of two rectangles, or of the elements color and shape. But the concept of composition could also be stretched in such a way that the smaller surface is called 'composed' of a larger one and one subtracted from it. Compare the ›composition‹ of the forces, ›division‹ of a line by a point outside; These expressions show that we may also be inclined to regard the smaller as the result of the combination of the larger and the larger as a result of the division of the smaller.
But I don't know whether to say that the figure that our sentence describes consists of four elements or nine! Well, is that sentence made up of four letters or nine? - And which ones are his Elements: the letter types or the letters? Doesn't it matter which one we say? if we only avoid misunderstandings in special cases!

49. But what does it mean that we cannot explain (i.e. describe) these elements but only name them? That could say that the description of a complex, if, in a borderline case, only consists of one Square is simply the name of the color square.
One could say here - although this easily leads to all sorts of philosophical superstitions - a sign "R", or "S", etc., could be a word and a sentence. But whether it is 'word or sentence' depends on the situation in which it is spoken or written. Should z. B. Describe A to B complexes of color squares and uses the word "R" here aloneso we shall be able to say that the word is a description - a sentence. But if he memorizes the words and their meanings, for example, or if he teaches another how to use the words and pronounces them in the instructional teaching, we will not say that they are sentences here. For example, in this situation the word "R" is not a description; man names thus an element - but that is why it would be strange to say that the element can be used here just to name! Naming and describing don't stand up one Level: Naming is a preparation for description. Naming is not at all a move in the language game - any more than the setting up of a chess piece is a move in a chess game. You can say: naming a thing is still Nothing done. It Has no name either, except in the game. That was also what Frege meant by that: a word only has meaning in the context of a sentence.

50. What does it mean to say of the elements that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to them? - One could say: If everything we call "to be" or "not to be" lies in the existence and non-existence of connections between the elements, then there is no point in speaking of the being (non-being) of an element; and if all we call "destroy" is the separation of elements, there is no point in talking about the destruction of an element.
But one would like to say: One cannot attribute being to the element, because would not it, it could not even be called that and therefore nothing could be said about it. - Let's look at an analog case! One can from one Thing does not say that it is 1 m long, nor that it is not 1 m long, and that is the standard meter in Paris. With this, of course, we have not ascribed any strange quality to it, but only characterized its peculiar role in the game of measuring with the meter rule. - Let us imagine in a similar way to how the original meter also stores the samples of colors in Paris. This is how we explain: "Sepia" is the color of the original sepia kept there in the absence of air. Then it will make no sense to say of this pattern that it has this color, nor that it does not have it.
We can put it this way: This pattern is an instrument of the language with which we make color statements. In this game it is not what is represented, but a means of representation. And this is precisely what applies to an element in the language game (48) when we pronounce the word "R" while naming it: we have given this thing a role in our language game; It is now medium the representation. And to say »Would it doesn't, so it couldn't have a name ”says so much and as little as: if this thing didn't exist, we couldn't use it in our game. - What there is, apparently, to give got to, belongs to language. It's a paradigm in our game; something to be compared to. And to establish this can mean to make an important statement; but it is nonetheless a statement concerning our language game - our mode of representation.

51. In the description of the language game (48) I said that the colors of the squares correspond to the words "R", "S", etc. But where does this correspondence consist? to what extent can one say that certain colors of the squares correspond to these signs? The explanation in (48) only established a connection between these signs and certain words in our language (the color names). - Well, it was assumed that the use of the signs in the game would be taught differently, namely by referring to paradigms. Well; but what does it mean to say in the Practice of language would the signs correspond to certain elements? - Is it because someone who describes the complex of color squares always says "R" where there is a red square; "S" where there is a black, etc.? But what if he makes a mistake in the description and, incorrectly, says "R" when he sees a black square - what is the criterion here for the fact that this is a error was? - Or does the "R" designate a red square mean that people who use the language always have a red square in mind when they use the "R" sign?
In order to see more clearly we must here, as in innumerable similar cases, consider the details of the events; what's going on look up close.

52. If I am inclined to assume that a mouse is spontaneously created from gray scraps and dust, it will be good to examine these scraps carefully to see how a mouse could hide in them, how it could get there, etc. Am But if I am convinced that a mouse cannot arise from these things, then this investigation will perhaps be superfluous.
But what it is that opposes such a consideration of the details in philosophy, we must first learn to understand.

53. There is now various Possibilities for our language game (48), different cases in which we would say that a character in the game names a square of the and the color. We would say this, for example, if we knew that the people who use this language have been taught to use the signs in such and such a way. Or, if it were recorded in writing, for example in the form of a table, that this element corresponds to this sign, and if this table were used when teaching the language and drawn on to a decision in certain disputes.
But we can also imagine that such a table is a tool in the use of language. The description of a complex then proceeds as follows: The person who describes the complex carries a table with him and looks for every element of the complex in it and moves from it to the symbol in the table (and the person who gave the description can also will translate the words of the same through a table into the vision of colored squares). One could say that this table takes on the role that memory and association play in other cases. (We won't usually execute the command "Bring me a red flower!" By looking up the color red in a color table and then bringing a flower of the color we find in the table; but when it comes to it to choose or to mix a certain shade of red, then it happens that we use a sample or a table.)
If we call such a table the expression of a rule of the language game, one can say that what we call the rule of a language game can have very different roles in the game:

54. Let us think of the cases in which we say that a game is played according to a certain rule!
The rule can be a means of teaching in the game. It is communicated to the learner and its application is practiced. - Or it is a tool of the game itself. - Or: A rule is neither used in lessons nor in the game itself; it is still set out in a list of rules. You learn the game by watching others play it. But we say that the game is played according to the and the rules because an observer can read these rules from the practice of the game - like a law of nature that the game's actions follow - but how does the observer distinguish between a mistake by the player and the game a correct game plot? - There are characteristics for this in the behavior of the players. Think of the characteristic behavior of someone correcting a promise. It would be possible to see that someone is doing this even if we do not understand their language.

55. “What the names of the language denote must be indestructible: for one must be able to describe the state in which everything that can be destroyed has been destroyed. And in this description there will be words; and what corresponds to them must not be destroyed, otherwise the words would have no meaning. ”I must not saw off the branch on which I am sitting.
One could, of course, immediately object that the description itself must exclude itself from destruction. - But that which corresponds to the words of the description and therefore must not be destroyed if it is true is what gives the words their meaning - without which they would have no meaning. - But in one sense this person is what corresponds to his name. But it is destructible; and its name does not lose its meaning if the bearer is destroyed. - That which corresponds to the name and without which it would have no meaning is, for example, a paradigm that is used in connection with the name in the language game.

56. But how, if no such pattern belongs to language, if we, e.g. B., the color that denotes a word, notice? - “And when we remember it, it comes to our mind's eye when we say the word. So it has to be indestructible in itself if there is to be the possibility that we will remember it at any time. ”- But what do we see as the criterion for correctly remembering it? - If we work with a pattern instead of our memory, we may say that the pattern has changed its color and judge this with our memory. But can't we, under certain circumstances, also speak of a darkening (e.g.) of our memory image? Aren't we as exposed to memory as we are to patterns? (Because someone might want to say: "If we had no memory, we would be exposed to a pattern.") - Or a chemical reaction, for example. Think you should paint a certain color "F" and it is the color you see when the chemical substances X and Y combine with each other. - Suppose the color seems lighter one day than another; Wouldn't you possibly say: "I must be wrong, the color is certainly the same as yesterday"? This shows that we do not always use what memory says as the supreme, unappealable, arbitration award.

57. "Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing." - Certainly, there is no point in saying the color red (color, not pigmentum) will be torn or crushed. But don't we say, "The blush disappears"? And don't cling to the fact that we can call them to our minds even if there is no longer any red! This is no different than saying that there is still some chemical reaction that creates a red flame. - Because what if you can't remember the color? - If we forget what color it is that this name has, it loses its meaning for us; i.e., we can no longer play a certain language game with it. And then to compare the situation is that the paradigm, which was a means of our language, has been lost.

58. "I will >Surname‹Only name that which cannot be found in the connection› X exists ‹. - And so one cannot say 'Red existed because if it weren't for red, it couldn't be talked about at all.' - More correct: If 'X exists' is supposed to mean something like: 'X' has meaning - then is it is not a sentence that deals with X, but a sentence about our use of language, namely the use of the word "X".
It seems to us that we are saying something about the nature of red: that the words "red exists" make no sense. It just exists 'in and of itself'. The same idea - that this is a metaphysical statement about red - is also expressed in the fact that we say, for example, that red is timeless, and perhaps even more so in the word "indestructible".
But actually want we just understand "red exists" as a statement: the word "red" has meaning. Or perhaps more correctly: “Red does not exist” as “'Red' has no meaning”. We just don't want to say that that expression is that saysbut that he the would have to say if he would have a purpose. But that he contradicts himself when he tries to say this - since red is 'in and of itself'. While a contradiction lies only in the fact that the sentence looks as if it were talking about color, while it is supposed to say something about the use of the word "red". - In reality, however, we very well say that a certain color exists; and that means something like: something exists that has this color. And the first term is no less precise than the second; especially not where 'that which has the color' is not a physical object.

59. »Names only denote what element which is reality. What cannot be destroyed; what remains the same in all change. "- But what is it? - While we were saying the sentence, we had it in mind! We already expressed a very specific idea. A specific image that we want to use. Because experience does not show us these elements. We see Components of something composed (e.g. an armchair). We say that the backrest is part of the armchair, but is itself reassembled from different woods; while a foot is a simple component. We also see a whole that changes (is destroyed) while its constituent parts remain unchanged. These are the materials from which we create that picture of reality.

60. If I now say: "My broom is in the corner" - is this actually a statement about the broomstick and the brush of the broom? In any case, one could replace the statement with one that specifies the position of the handle and the position of the brush. And this statement is like a further analyzed form of the first. - But why do I call them "further analyzed"? - Well, if the broom is there, it means that the handle and brush must be there and in a certain position to one another; and this used to be hidden in the sense of the sentence, and it is in the analyzed sentence pronounced. So whoever says the broom is in the corner actually means: the handle is there and the brush, and the handle is in the brush? - If we asked someone if he meant that, he would probably say that he had never thought of the broomstick in particular, or of the brush in particular. And that would be the right one